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1. Introduction 
Despite the fact that the general shareholder meeting is the supreme decision-making organ 
within a corporation, few challenge the argument by Jensen (1993) that it is the board of 
directors that plays the most important role in the internal control system. In a modern 
corporate system, where management is separated from ownership, the primary mission of the 
board of directors is to supervise corporate management on behalf of the shareholders.  In other 
words, if the responsibility of senior managers is to make decisions at their own discretion 
regarding business operations, that of the board of directors should be to exercise effective 
control over such management decisions. This also holds true for the post-communist 
transitional countries including Russia, where establishing effective corporate governance 
mechanisms has become an important political issue. It is especially pertinent in former 
socialist enterprises. 
In Russia, a country undergoing great transformation to a market economy, competition in 
product markets is weak in many industries (Broadman, 2000). Capital markets and the market 
for corporate control also remain underdeveloped (Sugiura, 2007). Under such circumstances, 
Russian firms are expected to establish internal controls that are as strong and functional as 
those of developed countries in order to effectively promote discipline in corporate 
management. As will be discussed later, to ensure that the interests of a firm's shareholders are 
represented, Russian corporate law stipulates that the board of directors in a joint-stock 
company is responsible for the personnel management of executive officers, the supervision 
and the provision of advice on business affairs, and the decision making on management 
strategies (Iwasaki, 2007a). 
Russian investors, however, have a propensity to underestimate the role of the corporate 
board due to the much stronger ownership concentration and much higher proportion of 
managerial ownership in their companies than in their Western counterparts. However, each 
governance mechanism plays a complementary role that is specifically effective in certain 
aspects or stages of agency problem solving. The same logic can be applied to boards of 
directors relative to such issues such as the protection of minority shareholders. This means 
that corporate boards are being required to protect minority shareholders, which has presented 
a significant challenge in Russian corporate governance (Lazareva et al., 2007). As such, the 2 
 
importance of management supervision by the board members in Russian companies cannot be 
overemphasized. 
In addition, insider control itself does not represent the general characteristics of firms’ 
organization in present-day Russia. Although shareholding by a handful of private investors is 
regarded as one of the peculiarities of Russian firms against the backdrop of significant decline 
in state ownership and weak institutional investors, ownership structure of the large and 
middle-scale enterprises tends to grow more diffuse year by year (Dolgopyatova, 2007; 
Chernykh, 2008). Moreover, many Russian firms have now hired professional managers. 
Growing interest in monitoring top management through corporate boards reflects these 
irreversible movements in the Russian business sector. Therefore, it is understandable that 
currently in Russia the prevalence of outsider directorship is regarded as a key policy issue for 
the further development of enterprise reform and corporate governance (Kostikova, 2003). 
Nevertheless, to the best of our knowledge, there has never been any thorough study of board 
structure in Russia or in other transitional countries.
1 
To deepen our understanding of transition economies, this study attempts to identify the 
determinants of board composition in Russian companies through a comprehensive 
reexamination of the theoretical and empirical implications in developed countries. This is the 
primary objective of this paper, and it raises the question of which dimension of a firm’s 
organization and which of its business activities are essential for the empirical analysis of 
Russian corporations. To address this issue, the potential determinants of board composition 
are classified into two categories. The first is governance variables in a narrow sense, and 
include those relating to a firm’s organization, such as ownership structure and company size. 
The second is business-activity variables, consisting of those relating to business type, 
                                                        
1   Several studies have dealt with corporate boards in the former Russian state-owned enterprises 
and newly established corporations. They include the pioneering works of Dolgopyatova (1995), 
Blasi and Shleifer (1996), Afanasiev et al. (1997), and Filatotchev et al. (1999). Most previous 
studies, however, simply imply the existence of a close association between ownership structure 
and board composition in Russian corporations (Iwasaki, 2007b).  In addition, there are virtually 
no empirical works that examine the determinants of board structure in other transition 
economies. 3 
 
R&D/innovation activities, corporate financing, and financial performance. The governance 
variables are further divided into bargaining variables, which reflect the bargaining power of 
managers and that of interested parties who are in conflict with the managers, and other 
governance variables. In this paper, the impact of each of the three variable groups on board 
composition is empirically compared. 
As a second objective, we propose and validate several theoretical hypotheses concerning 
the interrelation of board composition with the special features of corporate law and the 
transition economy in Russia. While, in general, Russian corporate law adopts the 
Anglo-American type of corporate model, it introduces several unique regulations regarding 
the governance mechanism in joint-stock companies, including placing a lower limit on board 
size, prohibiting the vesting of the two titles of company top manager and board chairman on 
one person, and not allowing other executive directors to concurrently assume one-fourth or 
more of the board membership  (Black and Kraakman, 1996). An investigation of the impact of 
these legal arrangements on board composition would definitely be worthwhile. Moreover, 
Russian law requires an investor to choose a legal form of incorporation for a joint-stock 
company. The choice is between an open and a closed arrangement, in which the degree of 
share transferability to third parties differs considerably (Iwasaki, 2007c).The impact of 
privatization and spin off from a state-owned enterprise or a privatized firm on board 
composition is also of great interest. In addition, the potential influence of integration with 
so-called business groups on corporate governance in their affiliate companies cannot be 
overlooked. In Russia, holding companies and other types of business alliances have 
mushroomed across the country as a result of the enterprise privatization of the 1990s, and 
these business groups play a crucial role in the management of a country’s big businesses 
(Guriev and Rachinsky, 2005). An empirical study of the afore-mentioned specific features of 
the Russian economy in terms of their effects on board composition will contribute valuable 
findings and theoretical viewpoints to the study of transition economies as well as to the field 
of financial and organizational economics. 
To investigate the two objectives stated above, we conduct an empirical analysis of the 
determinants of board composition dealing with possible endogeneity of board size and 
leadership structure. Recent works have focused considerable attention on this structural aspect 4 
 
in corporate boards (Lehn et al., 2005; Boone et al., 2007; Coles et al., 2008; Linck et al., 2008). 
We concur with these findings and follow their empirical strategy. 
We found that the theories and empirical methods of financial and organizational economics 
help to pinpoint the factors affecting board composition in Russian firms. We also found that, 
among potential determinants, the bargaining variables have great explanatory power and 
statistical significance. Furthermore, our empirical evidence demonstrated that Russia’s legal 
system and its peculiarities as a transition economy also exert a certain degree of influence on 
the proportion of outsider directors in the board (i.e., their percentage over all directors). 
Finally, we confirmed a strong positive interrelation between the appointment of an outsider 
chairman and the extent of outsider directorship in Russian firms by estimating multivariate 
regression models that explicitly endogenize board composition and leadership structure. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains a description of the 
data employed for this study. Section 3 examines the legal framework of board structure in 
Russian joint-stock companies. Section 4 presents the testable hypotheses. Section 5 conducts 
empirical analysis, and Section 6 summarizes the major findings and concludes the paper. 
 
2. Data 
As the basis for the empirical analysis in this paper, we utilize the results of a large-scale 
enterprise survey conducted in 2005 across Russia by a Japan-Russia joint research team from 
Hitotsubashi University and the Higher School of Economics. The enterprise survey was 
designed to understand the evolutionary process of firm organization and business 
environments in transforming Russia, shedding light on corporate governance in the former 
socialist enterprises. 
The survey was performed from February to June 2005, and 859 members of top 
management from industrial and communications enterprises in 64 federal districts were 
interviewed by professional staff members dispatched from the Levada Center, the former 
USSR Public Opinion Poll Center of the Ministry of Labor, or its local branches. The target 
companies were selected by the method of stratified sampling among firms with more than 100 
workers. Of the 859 companies surveyed, valid responses were received from 822firms. Of 
these 822 respondents, 94.8% were company presidents (or CEOs or general directors) or vice 5 
 
presidents. The remaining respondents were board chairmen (1.6%) or senior managers 
responsible for corporate governance affairs (3.6%).
2 
All sample firms were joint-stock companies, and the average number of workers per 
company was 1,884 (median: 465). The total number of workers of these surveyed firms was 
1,549,008, which accounted for 10.3% of the total workforce in both the industrial and the 
communication sectors through 2004 according to official statistics (Rosstat, 2005). 
Furthermore, regarding the regional and sectoral composition of the surveyed firms, they 
formed a representative sample of Russian medium- and large-scale corporations, reflecting 
our research focus on the former state-owned enterprises transformed into joint-stock 
companies as a result of the mass-privatization policy in the early 1990s and their de novo 
private counterparts established in the transition period. 
The survey results include information on the size of the boards, the basic attributes of the 
board directors, and the methods used for the appointment of board chairmen, which made it 
possible to carry out a detailed investigation of 741 board chairmen and 4,818 directors.
3 In 
addition, the databases of SKRIN and SPARK Co., both of which are major company 
information agencies in Russia, were utilized in this study to obtain data on the financial 
performance, the industrial classification, and the percentage of ownership shares held by the 
managers of our sample firms. 
 
3. Legal framework of the board structure in Russia 
In Russia, the legal basis for joint-stock companies is covered by the provisions of the Civil 
Code and the Federal Law on Joint-Stock Companies (Law on JSCs), and is supplemented by 
the Corporate Governance (CG) Code.
4  
                                                        
2    The questionnaire used for the joint survey was carefully designed by the project members and 
experts of the Levada Center based on similar surveys conducted in the past, although it is 
impossible to completely avoid bias and moral hazard problems with respect to self-reporting. 
3   For more details of our enterprise survey, see Dolgopyatova and Iwasaki (2006). 
4   These provisions refer to Part I, Chapter 4 (Art. 96 to 104) of the Civil Code of November 30, 
1994 (effective January 1, 1995), the Federal Law on Joint-Stock Companies of December 26, 
1995 (effective January 1, 1996), and the resolution of the Federal Commission for the Securities 
Market dated April 4, 2002, regarding the recommendation of the adoption of the Corporate 6 
 
According to Russian corporate law, all joint-stock companies whose voting shares are held 
by more than 50 persons are required to establish a board of directors. The number and 
appointment of board members are determined exclusively by an ordinary resolution of a 
shareholder meeting (Law on JSCs, Art. 48(1), Para. 4). Nevertheless, there are strict legal 
requirements as to the minimum number of directors: Companies with fewer than 1,000 voting 
shareholders must have no fewer than 5 directors; those with 1,000 or more but fewer than 
10,000 voting shareholders must have no fewer than 7 directors; and those with 10,000 or more 
voting shareholders must have no fewer than 9 directors  (Art. 66(3)). There is no statutory 
upper limit. 
Regarding the selection of board members and chairpersons, the Russian legislation and 
ordinance contain several unique regulations. We summarize them into the following four 
points: 
First, the term of office for directors is one year (defined as the date of appointment to the 
date of the next annual shareholder meeting), and all director seats must be contested at a 
regular shareholder meeting to be held no earlier than two months and no later than six months 
from the commencement of the fiscal year (Art. 47(1)). In other words, a staggered board is not 
permitted, in contrast to the cases of the U.S. and France. Moreover, all directors must be 
elected through cumulative voting, a system that aims to protect the interests of minority 
shareholders (Art. 66(4)). A board chairman is elected among the directors approved at a 
shareholder meeting by a simple majority. 
Second, the management and supervisory bodies of Russian joint-stock companies strictly 
prohibit their managers from assuming board membership. The Law on JSCs prohibits the top 
manager (single executive organ) from serving as his/her company board chairman. In addition, 
it also prevents members of the collective executive organ (the management/administration 
division), which consists of senior managers, from accounting for one-fourth or more of the 
board membership (Law on JSCs, Art. 66(2)). A collective executive organ headed by a 
company president is an internal executive organization, and its function is, as with that of a 
single executive organ, to supervise daily management matters except for those that fall within 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Governance Code.  This section was written by taking into account the laws and regulations that 
were in effect in Russia during the period of the 2005 enterprise survey. 7 
 
the authority of the shareholder meetings and the board of directors (Law on JSCs, Art. 69(2)). 
It is assumed that the role of a collective executive organ is to clarify managerial 
responsibilities and to make the board of directors more independent from the management of 
the company (Iwasaki, 2007a). In addition, members of the audit committee established as a 
subordinate organ to the general shareholder meeting for the purpose of investigating financial 
and management activities may not become board members (Art. 85(6)). 
Third, the Law on JSCs, however, includes no provision preventing the board chairman 
from being elected from among insiders; moreover, it allows joint-stock companies to 
determine at their own discretion whether to establish a collective executive organ (Art. 69(1)). 
As discussed in Iwasaki (2007a), the adoption of a collective executive organ requires an 
amendment of the articles of incorporation and is determined by a supermajority resolution at a 
general shareholder meeting (passed by a majority of not less than three-quarters of the votes of 
present shareholders owning a majority of voting shares); this makes it highly possible for 
managers to attempt to reject requests from outside shareholders to increase the level of 
managerial monitoring in collusion with affiliated companies and employees. It is also likely 
that a top manager with significant ownership could appoint an individual under his influence 
to the board chairmanship. 
Fourth, the CG Code is a kind of government decree issued by the Federal Commission for 
Securities Market (FCSM) in April 2002. This document was compiled by government 
officials and experts on the basis of the OECD’s Corporate Governance Principles and 
stipulates the rules to be followed by all joint-stock companies operating in Russia with regard 
to corporate management, the basic principles of corporate governance, and the settlement of 
internal disputes. The CG Code devotes much space to matters regarding the board of directors, 
setting forth detailed rules on board structure as well as the appointment of board members 
with the aim that Russian firms converge to international governance standards (Chapter 3, 
Section 2). However, the CG Code contains very few concrete targets of board composition; 
one of the mandates that joint-stock companies include in their articles of incorporation is the 
provision that they have at least three independent directors
5 who account for no less than 
                                                        
5    The CG Code defines an “independent director” as one who meets seven criteria for 
independence, which include (a) that the director has not been a manager or an employee of the 8 
 
one-fourth of the board membership (Section 2.2.3). 
With regard to the competence of the board of directors, the Law on JSCs empowers board 
members to make many important managerial decisions, which can be classified roughly into 
five fields: (a) overseeing acquisitions, divestitures, establishment, reorganization and 
liquidation of company, branches and affiliates; (b) overseeing major capital financing, 
expenditures and transactions; (c) preparing and organizing the general shareholders' meeting; 
(d) nominating, compensating, monitoring and replacing corporate executives; (e) reviewing 
and guiding corporate strategy, major plans of action, business plans, annual reports, and other 
financial and internal documents.
6  Furthermore, their decision-making rights may not be 
delegated to the executive organs (Art. 65(2)). These provisions ensure that the corporate 
boards in Russia fulfill the same role and functions as those in the U.S. and other developed 
countries. 
 
4. The logic of board composition in the context of a Russian transition economy 
As stated in the Introduction, the factors affecting board composition can be divided into 
governance variables and business-activity variables. The former contain the “bargaining 
variables” (Arthur, 2001) which reflect the bargaining power of company managers and that of 
their countervailing parties. In the following three subsections, we consider in detail the 
specific factors included in each of these three variable groups and their possible impacts on 
board composition. In Subsection 4.4, we also discuss the possible interrelations within a board 
structure. 
4.1. Bargaining variables 
Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) propose a negotiation model in which board structure 
endogenously arises from the CEO bargaining power over outsider directors. In their model 
CEOs use their influence to limit board independence by nominating non-independent 
directors to open positions. Boone et al. (2007) extend this argument and state that outsider 
                                                                                                                                                                    
company over which he assumes the directorship or its parent company for three years prior to 
the date of appointment; (b) that the director is not an affiliate of the company; and (c) that the 
director is not a representative of the government. 
6  For more details, see the Appendix. 9 
 
representation on the board is negatively related to the CEO’s bargaining power and is 
positively related to constraints on the CEO’s influence. By taking into account the more 
collective manner in which Russian enterprises are managed compared to Anglo-American 
corporations and the significant influence of a handful of large shareholders, it would be more 
appropriate to regard the influence of a management group as well as that of major outside 
shareholders. In other words, the negotiation model “CEO versus outsider directors” presented 
by Hermalin and Weisbach needs to be expanded to read “management group versus 
countervailing parties” in order to thoroughly understand the actual state of a Russian firm. 
In our empirical tests we use three proxies of the bargaining power of the top manager and 
management group: the new appointment of top manager, the ownership share of top manager, 
and the ownership share of management group. The CEO’s bargaining power derives from 
his/her perceived ability, for which CEO tenure becomes a good proxy (Linck et al., 2008). It is 
presumed that a top manager with long tenure will be more likely to influence the monitoring 
function of the corporate board. In contrast, a newly appointed top manager is more likely in 
the short term to have a company board with a high proportion of outsider directors, given his 
weak influence on the director appointment process and/or his strategy to ask for managerial 
advice and counseling from outsiders until the company management is on track under his 
leadership (Weisbach, 1988). In the case of Russia, attention is now centered on the new 
generations of top managers replacing the “red executives,” or former communist company 
managers, who had dominated the business sector during the socialist era. Therefore, we test 
the possible positive correlation between the appointment of new top managers and the 
independence of the corporate board in their companies. On the other hand, since shareholding 
by a top manager and management group improves their bargaining positions, we expect board 
independence to be negatively related to their ownership stake.  
In our empirical analysis, the new appointment of a top manager is represented by a dummy 
variable, which takes 1 for those firms with a top manager appointed in or after 2001 
(NEWCEO). As for ownership of corporate officers, we utilize a large management shareholder 
dummy with a value of 1 if the company has a specific manager or a specific managerial group 10 
 
as its large shareholder
7 (MANSHA), the share ownership by the top manager (OWNCEO), and 
the management group ownership in the total number of outstanding shares (OWNMAN). The 
latter two ownership variables originate in the SKRIN open resources. 
To proxy for the influence of countervailing parties, we use the ownership share of large 
outsider shareholders and affiliation with a business group. The agency theory hypothesizes 
that the existence of major outsider shareholders renders supervision by outsider directors less 
necessary because these large shareholders have a sufficient incentive and capability to 
actively perform monitoring functions by exercising their influence when necessary or because 
they can discipline managers effectively by increasing the possibility of takeover by third 
parties (Rediker and Seth, 1995). However, shareholders can use their bargaining power to 
reinforce the monitoring function of the board in order to increase their ability to collect 
managerial information or to strengthen their authority to dismiss managers who fail to 
increase corporate values. This is particularly true if shareholders live in countries where the 
corporate control market is still underdeveloped or where selling all of their shares would be 
too costly (Whidebee, 1997). In fact, a significant amount of empirical evidence from the 
studies on listed companies in Japan supports such a hypothesis. In Japan the capital market is 
less effective for the development of corporate governance than it is in Europe and the U.S. 
Other supporting evidence comes from research dealing with unlisted firms and emerging 
markets (Kaplan and Minton, 1994; Mak and Li, 2001; Roosenboom, 2005). The current state 
of the Russian economy is clearly closer to that of Japan and emerging markets. Furthermore, 
in the case of Russia, where social distrust of corporate managers is relatively high, it is quite 
likely that large shareholders would maximize their presence in their invested companies by 
using any channel open to them. Accordingly, we predict that the ownership share of major 
outsider shareholders is positively related to board independence. For the empirical analysis, 
we utilize a 6-point scale of the combined ownership share of corporate ownership and foreign 
investors (OWNOUT). 
In Russia, business alliances are now burgeoning both at the federal level, as represented by 
financial-industrial groups led by commercial banks, major industrial enterprises, and newly 
                                                        
7  It denotes a shareholder or a shareholder group that has greater than 25% ownership or retains 
ownership that enables him/her to block strategic decisions by his/her company. 11 
 
emerged financial cliques called “oligarchs,” and at the regional level. In fact, our survey 
indicates that 323 (39.3%) of the 822 surveyed firms are affiliated with a certain business group 
through shareholding. The most important and, probably, the most dominant owners of these 
business groups are holding companies and core group firms. While the individuals or 
organizations leading these business groups are responsible for monitoring their group 
companies, it is also a fact that they share the same destiny with affiliates. In other words, 
although holding companies or core group firms can provide an effective monitoring role over 
their subordinates, collusion among them with their affiliated firms is always possible, leading 
to a reduction in their shareholder wealth. In theory, it is difficult to determine which is greater, 
the monitoring or the collusion effect. In this regard, however, previous studies have 
empirically confirmed that affiliation with a business group helped a company improve its 
managerial discipline and promote its restructuring activity (Kuznetsov and Muravyev, 2000; 
Perotti and Gelfer, 2001; Guriev and Rachinsky, 2005).
8  Similarly, it is now commonly 
accepted among researchers that membership of a business group promotes more sensible 
corporate governance than that observed in independent enterprises. Hence, we expect that 
participation in a business group will enhance the monitoring role of a corporate board in 
member firms. In our empirical tests, the presence of a business group as a major owner is 
represented by a group firm dummy (GROFIR) for participation in a business group through 
share ownership. We also use a core group firm dummy (GROCOR) and an affiliate firm 
dummy (GROAFF) to identify the possible asymmetrical effects of business integration on 
board composition due to differences among member firms in their position within the group. 
4.2. Other governance variables 
Beside bargaining variables, we give attention to the following six organizational features 
of Russian corporations as additional governance variables: soon-to-retire top managers; legal 
form of incorporation; upper limits on shareholding and voting rights set by the articles of 
incorporation; adoption of the collective executive organ; political background behind a 
company’s foundation; and company size. 
                                                        
8   Using the results of the joint survey, our research team also found empirical evidence that group 
firms are characterized by more effective corporate governance and greater intensity in firm 
restructuring than independent companies (Dolgopyatova et al., 2009). 12 
 
Over the past dozen years or so, a large number of Russian corporate managers of the 
socialist generation have been approaching retirement age. Therefore, the manner in which 
power is transferred to their successors is significant, since the managers of the socialist 
generation could have considerable impact on the process of appointing new directors. As in 
the case of U.S. companies (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1988; Baker and Gompers, 2003), a 
soon-to-retire Russian top manager is more likely to accept as his/her successor a member of 
the corporate board, resulting in a significant increase in the proportion of insider directors. 
Mayers et al. (1997) in a comparative analysis of joint-stock and mutual companies in the 
U.S. insurance sector confirmed that the boards of directors of mutual companies perform a 
stronger monitoring function than those of joint-stock companies in order to achieve an 
adequate level of managerial discipline. In their view, this is because mutual companies, on 
account of their limited share transferability, have weaker alternative governance mechanisms 
to replace the role of corporate boards than joint-stock companies. In the case of Russia, an 
individual who intends to set up a joint-stock company must choose as a legal form of 
incorporation either an open company, whose shares can be freely traded, or a closed company, 
whose shares can be traded only among the promoters and other designated investors, in 
accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code (Article 97) and the Law on JSCs (Article 7). 
This difference in corporate form may affect board composition in a similar way to the 
aforementioned distinction between mutual companies and joint-stock companies. It implies 
that the choice of an open joint-stock company is negatively related to board independence. 
Russian law allows a joint-stock company, regardless of its corporate form, to set an upper 
limit on the number or face value of shares or voting rights held by one shareholder in its 
articles of incorporation (Law on JSCs, Art. 11(3)). In fact, the joint survey revealed that 104 
(14.4%) of the 723 responding firms had an upper limit on ownership per shareholder and that 
125 (17.2%) of the 726 responding firms had an upper limit on the voting rights by one 
shareholder. These restrictions, probably set for the purpose of allowing managers to 
monopolize their discretional authority, are likely to significantly undermine the voice of 
shareholders and, as such, limit outsider representation on the board. 
As explained in Section 3, the Law on JSCs prohibits 25% or more board membership from 
being represented by collective executive organ members. If managers are strictly compliant 13 
 
with the purpose of this provision, the establishment of a collective executive organ may 
restrict the selection of insider directors. However, as already noted, there is a serious loophole 
in this provision. Hence, we predict that the adoption of a corrective executive organ is 
positively related to board independence, but that the statistical significance of its association is 
relatively low. 
It is common knowledge that the vast majority of middle- and large-scale enterprises in 
Russia are privatized enterprises, many of which still have state shares.
9 These former socialist 
enterprises still draw much more public attention than do de novo private firms. This means 
that compared with 100% privately owned companies established during the transition period, 
traditional former state-run enterprises are likely to have more outsider directors in order to be 
properly accountable to the state and the public as well as to receive various kinds of support 
from the government (Li, 2004; Beiner et al., 2004). Consequently, we expect that former 
state-owned corporations and newly established enterprises spun off from state-owned or 
privatized companies that are using their assets are expected to have corporate boards with a 
higher level of independence than newly-born private enterprises. 
The expansion of the organizational size of a company is accompanied by issues related to 
the complexity of the firm’s organization and the expansion of its relationships with the state 
and society. The existing literature shows that firm size is one of the most important 
explanatory variables for board composition with unambiguous signs. Larger firms need 
directors to provide wider expertise and, hence, require more outsiders on the board (Denis and 
Sarin, 1999; Booth et al., 2002; Lehn et al., 2005; Linck et al., 2008). Moreover, because their 
large size creates more crucial agency problems, larger companies demand more outsider 
directors (Boone et al., 2007).
10 Thus, we presume that company size is positively related to 
board independence. 
                                                        
9   Of our randomly selected sample of 822 firms, 570 (69.3%) are previously state-owned 
enterprises, and 79 (9.6%) are newly established companies spun off from state-run enterprises 
or privatized enterprises.  In addition, of the 563 surveyed firms with inherited assets from the 
state, 105 (18.7%) have state ownership, although the degree of state ownership varies from 
company to company. 
10 The author thanks Dr. Tina Yang for sharpening the discussion on this point. 14 
 
The variables used to investigate the impacts of other governance variables are CEOAGE, 
indicating that the enterprise has a top manager of retirement age (61 or older), OPECOM, 
which captures open joint-stock companies, LIMOWN, which assigns a value of 1 to companies 
that have an upper limit on ownership per shareholder in its articles of incorporation, COLEXE, 
which is equal to 1 if a company adopts a collective executive organ, and PRICOM or SPIOFF, 
which denotes that the company is a former state-owned (or ex-municipal) privatized 
enterprise or is a newly established firm spun off from a state-owned enterprise or a privatized 
firm, respectively.  COMSIZ, the total number of employees, is used as a proxy for company 
size.  In regression analysis, we utilize the log of COMSIZ as an independent variable. 
4.3. Business-activity variables 
As business-activity variables, we test the impact of business diversification, 
R&D/innovation strategy, financial performance, debts, and business internationalization on 
board composition. 
Business diversification increases the chances that an expert familiar with the new market 
will become a board member. Mayers et al. (1997), Anderson et al. (2000), and Prevost et al. 
(2002) suggest that entering a new market requires more outside expertise. We also expect that 
the number of business lines in a Russian company is positively related to the proportion of 
outside members on the company’s corporate board. 
Performing an intensive R&D/innovation strategy encourages companies to evaluate the 
performance of their managers on the basis of the quality of their decisions rather than on the 
basis of financial results specific to the business they manage because of its technical 
uncertainty and risky nature (Hill and Snell, 1988). Insider directors are the most appropriate 
for conducting such evaluations. On the other hand, outside board members are ineffective in 
supervising firms with deep firm-specific knowledge and high growth opportunities because 
higher information asymmetry results in higher monitoring costs (Lehn et al., 2005; Linck et al., 
2008). Hence, enterprises actively engaged in product development and innovation are 
expected to have a significantly smaller proportion of outsider directors. 
Many researchers have confirmed that the poor performance of a company comparative to 
that of its rivals and industry competitors has an impact on its dismissal of insider directors and 
its appointment of their successors from the outside regardless of differences in period and 15 
 
country (Harmalin and Weisbach, 1988; Kaplan and Minton, 1994; Peng, 2004; Yeh and 
Woidtke, 2005). In recent years, Russian investors have been paying more attention to 
company performance and investment efficiency against a background of rapid economic 
development and the related stock-trading boom in their country. Therefore, we expect that 
poor financial performance in the past is positively correlated with the proportion of outsider 
directors in Russian firms. 
Many earlier studies, including those of Kaplan and Minton (1994) and Linck et al. (2008), 
have acknowledged that the higher the debt ratio of a company, the stronger the managerial 
monitoring function of its corporate board. This is because increased monitoring pressure on a 
company from creditors trying to recover their credit and from outsider owners afraid of 
bankruptcy has a strong effect on board structure. Non-performing accounts payable and bank 
loans are still of serious economic concern in Russia. It is often the case in Russia that creditors 
become unable to recover their loans; therefore, it is quite reasonable to assume that creditors 
are subject to all possible kinds of monitoring pressure from their business partners and 
financing institutions. For these reasons, we predict that bank loans have a positive impact on 
the extent of outsider representation on the board. 
Increased overseas operations and international transactions may result in the company 
having more expert directors and foreign directors in order to gather information and 
know-how to deal with the foreign market and foreign business customs, as well as to secure 
useful contacts for expanding overseas operations. In the case of Russia, where there are strict 
government regulations on major export commodities, enterprises actively involved in 
overseas business may be more inclined to employ those who are skillful in dealing with 
high-ranking officials and bureaucrats in the fields of trade and tariffs. According to Li’s 
(1994) empirical analysis of enterprises in 10 industrialized states, however, the share of 
overseas sales in total sales affects the appointment of an outsider director in a nonlinear 
fashion. Hence, we expect that a high level of business internationalization is positively related 
to the proportion of outsider directors. 
In the empirical analysis, we use the level of business diversification (BUSLIN) measured 
by the number of business lines in accordance with the 2-digit industrial classifications in the 
Russian All-Union Classifier of the National Economy Branches (“OKONKh” in Russian 16 
 
abbreviation) available in the SKRIN database. The intensity of R&D/innovation activities is 
expressed using NEWPRO, a dummy variable that has a value of 1 if a company successfully 
developed new products or started innovation businesses in the period from 2001 to 2004. To 
proxy for past financial performance, we utilize the average rate of gross profit on sales from 
2001 to 2004 (PROAVE) derived from the SPARK database. PROAVE is a predetermined 
variable reflecting the business results of our samples for a period of several years prior to the 
2005 joint survey, which makes it possible to avoid any possible simultaneous bias between 
board structure and firm performance, and takes industry-adjusted values representing the 
distances from the median performance in each industry based on a method proposed by 
Eisenberg et al. (1998). The impact of debts on board composition is tested using BANCRE, a 
variable for the length of the lending period of bank credits borrowed by surveyed firms during 
the period from 2001 to 2004. To proxy for the degree of business internationalization, we 
employ the share of total exports in total sales (EXPSHA). 
4.4. Interrelations within a board structure 
Possible interactions occur between board composition and other board components, 
namely, board size and leadership structure. Past research suggests that companies with a larger 
corporate board tend to have more outsider directors, and vice versa. A board chairman 
appointed from the outside tends to encourage the presence of outsider directors. The same 
logic can be applied to outsider directors when they elect their chairman.
11  On the basis of 
these findings, we assume that both board size and the appointment of an outsider chairman 
may be positively interrelated with the extent of outsider representation on the board. To 
perform the empirical tests, we measure the proportion of outsider directors (OUTDIR) by 
dividing the number of outsider directors by the total number of board members. Board size 
(BOASIZ) covers the total number of directors on the board. In the regression analyses, we use 
the natural logarithm of BOASIZ. The variable of board leadership structure (OUTCHA) takes a 
value of 1 for firms with an outsider chairman. The correlation matrix shown in Table 1 
indicates the possibility of the above relationship among these board components. 
                                                        
11   In particular, see Li (1994), Rediker and Seth (1995), Yermack (1996), Whidbee (1997), 
Shivdasani and Yermack (1999), Arthur (2001), Mak and Li (2001), Prevost et al. (2002), Lehn 
et al. (2005), Boone et al. (2007), and Linck et al. (2008). 17 
 
Table 2 summarizes the theoretical discussions presented in this section. In the following 
section, we conduct empirical analyses to verify these testable hypotheses. 
 
5. Empirical analysis 
Based on the results of the 2005 joint enterprise survey, we first examine the actual board 
structure of Russian firms, and then the factors thought to be important to predict the board 
composition by univariate analysis. Lastly, we estimate multivariate regressions and conduct 
robustness checks. 
5.1. Actual structure of corporate boards in Russian joint-stock companies 
As explained in Section 3, Russian companies with less than 50 shareholders with voting 
rights are not required to have a board of directors. Our survey results show that of the 298 
sample firms whose total number of shareholders was known to us, 46 (15.4%) had fewer than 
50 shareholders, including 3 (1.0%) without a board of directors. The average (median) number 
of shareholders for these three firms was only 1.3 (1), much smaller than 18.1 (14) for the other 
43 enterprises, suggesting that the corporate board is widely adopted as a governance 
institution even for firms owned by a very small number of shareholders. 
The legal regulation on the minimum number of board directors significantly influences the 
actual board size. Of the 822 firms surveyed, 730 (88.8%) responded to our questions regarding 
their board size and the basic attributes of their board members (Table 3). According to these 
responses, joint-stock companies in Russia had an average number of 6.6 board members 
(median: 7).
12 Compared with approximately 19,000 enterprises in 19 countries throughout the 
world surveyed in 22 prior studies, the average board size of Russian companies is smaller than 
that of large listed firms in the U.S. and other major developed countries but almost the same as 
that of initial public offering (IPO) firms in those large nations and that of listed companies in 
small countries (Table 4). Moreover, Figure 1 shows that of the 730 surveyed firms in this 
study, only 76 companies (10.4%) had 10 or more board members and, most importantly, an 
overwhelming majority of our sample firms (520; 71.2%) concentrate in categories of 
companies with a total of 5, 7, or 9 board members. These findings strongly suggest that 
                                                        
12   These figures have been stable throughout the transition period and are consistent with the 
results of past surveys by Blasi and Shleifer (1996), Dolgopyatova (2003), and Yasin (2004). 18 
 
Russian firms on many occasions may simply follow the corporate legal requirements for 
making a choice regarding their board size. 
In this paper, a director appointed from among company managers, rank-and-file employees, 
and representatives of a labor union is defined as an “insider director,” and a director identified 
by other circumstances is referred to as an “outsider director.”
13 As Table 3 shows, the board of 
directors in a typical joint-stock company consists of 3.2 insider directors and 3.4 outsider 
directors, on average. A significant percentage (90.0%) of insider directors is appointed from 
among senior managers. In fact, insider directors of this type account for 43.9% of all directors, 
and they hold positions on the board in 640 (87.7%) of the 730 surveyed enterprises. Of the 
outsider directors, 75.6% represent private outsider owners. And 481 of the 730 surveyed firms 
(65.9%) have 3.9 (median: 4) directors, on average, representing private outside shareholders. 
As for independent directors,
14 they account for 6.5% of all directors and 12.7% of all outsider 
directors. However, only 138 (18.9%), or nearly one-fifth, of the 730 surveyed enterprises have 
one or more independent directors. This indicates that it was still not common to find 
independent directors in Russia in 2005. One of reasons for this is that the CG Code, as a new 
government decree with no legal binding force, had not yet had a significant effect. 
Among the 730 responding enterprises, the average proportion of outsider directors was 
48.9% (median: 55.6%).  As shown in Table 4, this level is much lower than that for companies 
in Europe, is nearly the same as that for listed firms in the U.K., U.S., China, and the 
Asia-Pacific region, and is much higher than that for Japanese companies. Since most of the 
surveyed firms are unlisted, it appears that the typical Russian company has the same level of 
openness as its counterpart in industrialized countries. Nevertheless, Figure 2 shows that most 
of our sample firms do not have a typical board structure. Rather, the majority of Russian 
companies are either governed by a board of directors with an extremely high proportion of 
outsider representation on the board or completely dominated by insiders. In this regard, it is 
noteworthy that the combined ownership share of corporate ownership and foreign investors 
                                                        
13  Here, due to constraints of the methodology used in the joint survey, no distinction was made 
between affiliated and non-affiliated individuals with regard to outsider directors (except for 
independent directors), as in many earlier studies involving developed countries. 
14  They fit the afore-mentioned definition in the CG Code. 19 
 
(OWNOUT) also has bi-modal distribution, suggesting that ownership structure and board 
composition are closely linked.
15 As reported by Peasnell et al. (2005) and Roosenboom (2005), 
the extent of outsider representation of listed and unlisted companies in developed countries 
has a bell-shaped distribution in general. In addition, the standard deviation of the outsider 
directorship ratio in our samples (35.3%) is much higher than those in US and European 
companies (less than 20%), so it would be quite appropriate to perceive the reality of Russian 
enterprises from the viewpoint of polarization in terms of the proportion of outsider directors. 
The answers from 741 enterprises that responded to the question regarding the manner in 
which they appointed their board chairmen show that 340 (45.9%) of all chairmen were 
promoted from within the company, defined as “insider chairmen” here,  and the remaining 401 
(54.1%)  were “outsider chairmen.” A total of 355 (88.5%) of all outsider chairmen were 
nominated from among those working in the business sector, and 46 (11.5%) were appointed 
from an administrative or legislative body of the Russian state. 
5.2. Univariate analysis 
In the following two subsections, we will test the impact of the potential factors affecting 
board composition. The definitions, the descriptive statistics, and the sources of the variables 
used in the empirical analysis are listed in Table 5. 
The right column in the table shows the correlation coefficients between the proportion of 
outsider directors and other variables. All bargaining variables except for GROCOR are 
significantly correlated with OUTDIR, which is consistent with the theoretical hypothesis. 
Regarding the other governance variables, a corporate charter’s maximum ownership 
restriction (LIMOWN) is negatively related to OUTDIR. The correlation coefficient between 
COLEXE and OUTDIR has a positive sign with statistical significance at the 5% level, 
suggesting that establishing a collective executive organ encourages the appointment of 
outsider directors. Both results also support out predictions. The total number of employees 
(COMSIZ) is positively related to OUTDIR, suggesting that the larger a company is, the more 
outsiders will join the board. 
Many business-activity variables are also significantly associated with the proportion of 
                                                        
15 In fact, of 671 surveyed firms, 337 (50.2%) lack domestic legal entities or foreign investors as 
their own shareholders.  In contrast, the majority share of 208 (31.0%) firms belongs to them. 20 
 
outsider directors. Business diversification (BUSLIN) may provide Russian enterprises with 
the incentive to increase outsider directors. The positive correlations between OUTDIR and the 
variables representing the past financial performance (PROAVE) and the use of bank credits 
(BANCRE) also support our testable hypotheses. The share of exports in total sales (EXPSHA) 
has a positive albeit weak relationship with OUTDIR. 
To examine in more detail the relationship between the relative position of outsider 
directors on a corporate board and ownership stake by company managers and outside 
investors, analyses of variance were performed using the four ownership variables classified 
according to the proportion of outsider directors. The results are shown in Table 6. The 
findings suggest close associations between the proportion of outsider directors and stock 
ownership held by company managers and outside large shareholders, which support our 
theoretical predictions. However, the results of the Scheffe multiple comparison test using 10 
sample groups divided according to the percentage of outsider directors indicate that the 
differences in the means between these individual sub-groups are not statistically significant in 
most cases. There may be a considerably higher level of variance within each sub-group due to 
the influence of other factors. Therefore, this point needs to be tested by multivariate analysis, 
with due consideration given to the impact of the ownership variables on the outsider director 
appointment. 
The board structure is also susceptible to influence by various factors differentiating one 
sector from another (Boone et al., 2007). The level of such influence can be assessed by 
comparing various industries in terms of the extent of outsider representation on the board. 
Table 7 shows the results. Our sample firms belong either to one of eight industrial sectors or 
the communications sector. Both a comparative analysis of industrial and communications 
firms and an analysis of variance of the 9 sectors identified statistically significant differences, 
suggesting that attention should be paid to industry fixed effects
16 in a regression analysis of 
board composition. 
5.3. Multivariate analysis 
                                                        
16  They are related to the production technologies, the intensity of state regulations, the industry 
protection measures, the level of market concentration, and the degree of public interest in the 
industry (i.e., mass media and local citizens), among others. 21 
 
Our regression analysis is designed to estimate a model expressed as () β x f OUTDIR= , 
where x and β are vectors of independent variables and parameters of interest, respectively. As 
shown in Figure 2, the dependent variable OUTDIR is far from the normal distribution 
(Shapiro-Wilk W=0.974, z=6.111, p=0.000). In addition, 245 (33.6%) of the 730 sample firms 
have either a lower threshold of 0.0 or an upper threshold of 1.0. The OLS estimator of a 
regression model with such an independent variable may become inconsistent. To mitigate this 
problem, we use the Tobit estimator with both upper and lower thresholds. 
The estimation results are summarized in Table 8. As discussed in Subsection 4.4, it is 
likely that board composition is interrelated with board size and leadership structure. However, 
in Model [1], which does not explicitly deal with the endogeneity within a board structure, we 
found that BOASIZ has no statistically significant impact on OUTDIR, which is in stark 
contrast with the highly significant impact of OUTCHA. We conjecture that it is concerned with 
the fact that the majority of Russian firms retain boards at the lower limit of membership 
stipulated by the corporate law, given the short history of company management under the 
market environment in Russia. Accordingly, in this paper, we report regression models that 
control solely for the endogeneity of board composition and leadership structure (Models [2] to 
[5]) using the Murphy-Topel variance-covariance estimator for the two-step model (Murphy 
and Topel, 1985). OUTCHA is instrumented by all other right-hand side variables plus the age 
level of the board chairman as an additional instrument (CHAAGE).
17 Moreover, we include 
fixed effects in each industry using 8 dummy variables in all regression models. As Boone et al. 
(2007) argue, the inclusion of industry fixed effects has the potential to control the unobserved 
industrial heterogeneity. 
Table 8 also shows that the dummy variable that captures companies with a newly appointed 
top manager (NEWCEO) is positively related, albeit insignificantly so, to the extent of outsider 
representation on the board in all models, which is in accordance with our hypothesis. In 
contrast, all the ownership variables take signs that are consistent with our predictions and 
                                                        
17  CHAAGE derives from our survey results. It rates the age of board chairmen on the following 
6-point scale: 0: 30 years or less; 1: 31 to 40; 2: 41 to 50; 3: 51 to 60; 4: 61 to 70; 5: 71 or more. 
The mean ± standard deviation is 2.38 ± 0.95. The correlation coefficient between CHAAGE and 
OUTCHA is 0.648. 22 
 
reject the null hypothesis that the coefficient is equal to zero at the 1% significance level. 
Moreover, the dummy variable for group companies (GROFIR) has a positive sign with 
statistical significance at the level of 5% or less. 
The remarkable differences in statistical significance between GROCOR and GROAFF 
show a stark gap between the core firms of the business groups and their affiliates in terms of 
the organizational philosophy of the groups. It is reasonable to infer that, in Russia, director 
exchanges within a business group are usually one-way, from its core company to its affiliated 
member firms, and therefore, not much emphasis is placed on the opinions of the managers of 
such controlled firms in the strategic decision-making process of the business group. Even 
though this working hypothesis requires empirical verification, it provides an important clue to 
understanding the ongoing dynamic trend of business integration in the Russian economy. 
In contrast to the bargaining variables, none of the other governance variables except for 
LIMOWN has a robust impact on the proportion of outsider directors on a corporate board. In 
other words, CEOAGE,  OPECOM, and COMSIZ lose their effects when the managerial 
ownership dummy MANSHA is  replaced by OWNCEO or OWNMAN. Contrary to the 
theoretical hypothesis, the dummy variable for firms with a collective executive organ 
(COLEXE) is negatively associated, albeit at a low level of significance, with the proportion of 
outsider directors but at a low level of significance. Political paths affecting company start-ups 
also do not reveal a robust impact on board composition. 
Among the business-activity variables, the estimates of the variables for past financial 
performance (ROAAVE) and the use of bank credits (BANCRE) are statistically robust and 
consistent with our theoretical predictions. The intensity of R&D/innovation activity 
(NEWPRO) is negative and is significant at the 5% level in Models [2] and [3], but its impact 
disappears when managerial ownership is controlled by OWNCEO or OWNMAN. BUSLIN and 
EXPSHA are insignificant. These findings suggest that it is almost statistically random whether 
there is an insider or an outsider in charge of business diversification and internationalization in 
Russia against the backdrop of an underdeveloped outsourcing market for human resources. 
Regarding the impact of board size and the appointment of an outsider chairman on board 
composition, BOASIZ falls short of the 10% significance level in all specifications. On the 
other hand, OUTCHA is always positive and significant at the 1% level even when we 23 
 
explicitly endogenize board composition and leadership structure. 
5.4. Robustness checks 
To examine the robustness of the estimation results from the multivariate analysis reported 
in the previous subsection, we conducted supplementary analyses of the individual regression 
models placed under various sample restrictions and confirmed that these restrictions had no 
major impact on the findings presented in Table 8. Specifically, supplementary regression 
analyses were performed in the following five different settings: (a) when the samples are 
limited to industrial firms; (b) when the enterprises involved in fuel/energy, metallurgy, and 
communication sectors and subject to unique state restrictions concerning firm organization 
and business activities are excluded from the observations; (c) when the samples are limited to 
those with a company size within the mean ± 1 standard deviation of all surveyed firms to 
exclude very large enterprises from the observations; (d) when the samples are limited to those 
yet to issue their securities; and (e) when the samples are limited to non group-affiliated firms. 
Moreover, no distinctive differences are observed in the estimation results even after 
replacing PROAVE with the simple difference between the actual value and the mean value for 
each industry. Furthermore, we used the rate of return on assets, the frequency of dividend 
payments to replace PROAVE, and the proportion of overdue accounts payable in total debts to 
replace BANCRE as alternative variables for the past firm performance and debts, and found 
that these three variables also have significant impacts on board composition, consistent with 
our testable hypotheses. 
Furthermore, we re-estimated the models using alternative estimation methods, including 
the two-stage least squares (2SLS) method,
18 a semi-parametric quantile regression model, a 
truncated regression model, and Heckman’s two-step estimation method.
19 The results showed 
                                                        
18 Using the 2SLS method, we estimated a simultaneous-equation model that takes three board 
components as endogenous dependent variables. We found that board size has no significant 
impact on either board leadership or composition, and vice versa.  In contrast, appointments of 
an outside board chairman and outsider representation on the board are positively associated 
with each other. See Iwasaki (2007d) for more details. 
19  Heckman’s two-step estimation method deals with the possible bias that may arise in the Tobit 
model when the coefficients for the independent variables for the existence of an outsider 
director are different from the coefficients for the independent variables for the proportion of 24 
 
no obvious differences from those of the original analyses reported in this paper. On the basis 
of these findings, we can safely say that the results of the multivariate analyses reported in 
Subsection 5.3 are statistically robust in the above sense. 
 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, we conducted a comprehensive analysis of the determinants of board 
composition in Russian joint-stock companies using the results of a Japan-Russia joint 
enterprise survey conducted in 2005. The findings strongly suggest that the theories and 
empirical methods of financial and organizational economics help to pinpoint the proportion of 
outsider directors in Russian firms. In other words, corporate managers and investors in 
contemporary Russia organize their monitoring and supervisory systems in accordance with 
the economic and organizational logics applied to mature capitalist economies. The 
long-standing and difficult attempt to shift to a market economy in Russia is now starting to 
bear fruit. 
However, the results of the empirical analysis do not support all the testable hypotheses 
proposed in Section 4. Rather, our empirical evidence demonstrates the greater explanatory 
power and statistical significance of the bargaining variables in comparison with other 
potential determinants of board composition. We suppose that this empirical evidence indicates 
that, in Russia, corporate boards are possibly the site for a struggle for hegemony over 
corporate management between company managers and their countervailing parties 
represented by large shareholders, who seek to maximize their power and benefits. This image 
is intuitively consistent with our understanding of the modern Russian economy. Even today, 
the country is still unable to cast off its negative image as an unreliable society. The awareness 
of Russian people of the importance of contracts and property rights and the business ethics of 
Russian managers are improving but there is still much work to be done. In this social 
environment, it is no wonder that investors do not expect much from other owners and creditors 
concerning their managerial discipline and choose to directly monitor corporate managers 
using all the channels available in attempts to maximize their interests. In response, corporate 
managers always behave opportunistically by being on the alert against such hostile investors. 
                                                                                                                                                                    
outsider directors. 25 
 
It is true that this deep-seated mutual distrust serves as a mechanism to make business 
enterprises functional. However, engaging in a heated battle for hegemony over the corporate 
board tends to be excessively time and energy consuming, contrary to the case of a society that 
is capable of achieving effective managerial discipline by properly utilizing different 
governance mechanisms. 
Furthermore, this study demonstrated that Russia’s legal system and its peculiarities as a 
transition economy have a certain influence on board composition. In particular, the intense 
management alliance with business groups that took place across Russia as a byproduct of the 
enterprise privatization in the 1990s considerably affects the governance system in their 
affiliated companies. The rules set by the corporate law and the CG Code may also have an 
impact on the decision-making process of Russian firms regarding board composition, 
although the multivariate regression analysis did not present statistically robust evidence of 
this point. In this regard, we found that the federal administrative directives that have been 
issued to encourage domestic companies to add more independent directors have not yet 
produced the desired outcome, partly because they are not sufficiently enforced. Until a certain 
level of mutual trust is established among Russian citizens, increased state regulations on the 
structure and functions of corporate boards and other statutory corporate organs may be 
effective for alleviating the aforementioned problems. 
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This table presents a correlation matrix of board components in 730 joint-stock companies that
participated in the Japan-Russia joint enterprise survey conducted in 2005. Sample companies were
randomly selected among firms with more than 100 workers in the industrial and communications
sectors. For more details, see Section 2 of the paper. The proportion of outsider directors (OUTDIR)
is measured by dividing the number of outsider directors by the total number of board members.
Board size (BOASIZ) covers the total number of directors on the board. Board leadership structure
(OUTCHA) is a dichotomous variable with a value of 1 for firms with an outsider chairman. Figures
in parentheses are p-values.  ***  and * denote statistical significance at the 1% and 10% level,
respectively.













New appointment of top manager +
Ownership share of top manager -
Ownership share of management group -
Ownership share of large outsider shareholders +
Affiliation with a business group +
Other governance variables
Soon-to-retire top manager -
Establishment of an open joint-stock company as the corporate form -
Restrictions on ownership shares and voting rights by the articles of incorporation -
Adoption of a collective executive organ (+)




Intensity of R&D/innovation activities -
Poor financial performance +
Debt +
Business internationalization/squared term -/+
Board size and leadership structure
Board size +
Outsider chairman appointment +
Table 2. Theoretical predictions of the impacts of firm organization and business activities on th
proportion of outsider directors on the board in the context of a Russian transition economy
This table summarizes the theoretical predictions of the impact of potential factors on board composition in Russian
firms on the basis of the discussion in Section 4 of the paper. The sign '+' denotes a positive correlation between a
given factor and the proportion of outsider directors, '-,' for a negative correlation, and '(+),' for a positive but
statistically weak correlation.Table 3.  Descriptive statistics on board size and number of directors by their attributes of 730 surveyed firm








Board size (total number of directors) 6.64 2.40 7 3 23 5 7 4,818 100.0
Insider directors 3.22 2.43 3 0 21 1 5 2,352 48.8
Managers 2.90 2.21 3 0 15 1 5 2,117 43.9
Representatives of employees and labor unions 0.32 1.15 0 0 21 0 0 235 4.9
Outsider directors 3.42 2.94 3 0 17 1 5 2,466 51.2
Representatives of non-employee private shareholders 2.55 2.59 2 0 17 0 4 1,865 38.7
Independent directors 0.43 1.13 0 0 10 0 0 314 6.5
Representatives of federal government agencies 0.18 0.77 0 0 8 0 0 135 2.8
Representatives of local governments 0.21 0.75 0 0 6 0 0 152 3.2
This table provides descriptive statistics on board size and number of board directors by their attributes of 730 Russian joint-stock companies. The samples are the same as
those in Table 1.Table 4. International comparison of board size and proportion of outsider director
Mean S. D. Median Mean S. D. Median
North America
U.S. IPO firms 
1 1978-87 1,116 6.07 1.87 6  
U.S. IPO firms
 2 1988-92 1,019 6.21 62  
U.S. listed firms
 3 1989-95 508 11.88 2.95 12  55.3 17.1 56.2
U.S. large industrial firms
 4 1999 100 11.79 2.94 12  71.8 12.1 73.0
U.S. large commercial banks
 4 1999 100 16.37 5.01 16  81.3 6.9 83.1
U.S. large public firms
 4 1999 100 11.46 2.74 11  80.5 11.7 83.3
U.S. listed firms
 5 a 1990-2003 9,436 8  7   65.2 70.0
Canadian listed firms
 6 1996 79 12.34 12  74   79  
Canadian public firms
 7 2000 38 10.81 3.07 11  89.4 10.6 90.0
Europe
U.K. listed firms
 8 1993-96 1,271 8.01 2.64 8  42.7 14.4 42.9
U.K. listed firms
 9 1994 250 8.07 2.84 8  39  
U.K. listed firms
 6 1996 66 12.03 12  48   50  
French IPO firms
 10 1993-99 299 5.30 2.32 5  53.1
French listed firms
 6 1996 42 12.93 13  81   82  
German listed firms 
6 1996 33 15.06 16  60   58  
Italian listed firms
 6 1996 56 9.23 9  74   81  
Spanish listed firms 
6 1996 28 12.29 11  75   80  
Swiss listed firms
 6 1996 17 9.12 9  90   90  
Swiss listed firms
 11 b 2001 165 6.59 2.33 6   87  15  89  
Dutch listed firms
 6 1996 37 6.84 7  
Dutch listed firms
 12 1996 94 4.95 1.83 5  84.3 19.9 100  
Belgian listed firms
 6 1996 12 13.17 11.5 76  81  
Swedish listed firms
 13 1996-98 98 8.18 2.01 84  13  
Finish small and medium-scale firms
 1 1992-94 879 3.71 1.52 3  
Russian joint-stock companies
 15 2005 730 6.64 2.40 7  48.9 35.3 55.6
Asia-Pacific
Japanese listed firms
 16 1990-2001 1,280 13.97 6.55 13  20.0 19.7 14.3
Chinese IPO firms
 17 c 1996 113 10.13 3.18 30  24  
Chinese listed firms
 18 1996 530 9.8 41  
Taiwanese listed firms
 19 1998 251 8.19 4.18 7  
Korean listed firms
 20 1990-99 199 10.51 8.36
Australian listed firms 
21 c 1989 135 5.56 2.03 5   62  27  67  
Singapore listed firms 
22 1995 147 8.04 2.08 8   57  21  57  
New Zealand listed firms 
23 1991-95 63-105 6.60 2.15 6  55.7 25.7 60.0
a The proportion of outsider directors is calculated using the data of the percentage of executive directors.
c The proportion of outsider directors covers only independent directors
This table reports board size and proportion of outsider directors in North-American, European, and Asia-Pacific companies based on the
following 23 studies: 1: Baker and Gompers (2003); 2: Boone et al. (2007); 3: Fich and Shivdasani (2006); 4: Booth et al. (2002); 5:
Linck et al. (2008); 6: de Andres et al. (2005); 7: Bozec (2005); 8: Peasnell et al. (2005); 9: Vefeas and Theodorov (1998); 10:
Roosenboom (2005); 11: Beiner et al. (2004); 12: van Ees et al. (2003); 13: Randøy and Jenssen (2004); 14: Eisenberg et al. (1998); 15:
this study; 16: Abe (2003); 17: Tian and Lau (2001); 18: Peng (2004); 19: Yeh and Woidtke (2005); 20: Kim (2005); 21: Arthur (2001);
22: Mak and Li (2001); and 23: Prevost et al. (2002).
b Board of auditors.
Board size
(total number of directors)
Proportion of
outsider directors (%) Analysis
period
Sample
sizeFigure 1. Board size of 730 Russian joint-stock companies
Figure 2. Proportion of outsider directors in 730 Russian joint-stock companies
The samples are the same as those in Table 1. Board size denotes the total number of board directors. The basic statistics of
board size are as follows: mean: 6.66; standard deviation: 2.44; median 7; skewness: 1.72; kurtosis: 9.26.
The samples are the same as those in Table 1. "Outsider director" denotes a director who was not appointed from among the
company managers, rank-and-file employees or representatives of a labor union. The proportion of outsider directors is
measured by dividing the number of outsider directors by the total number of board members for each sample firm. The basic

















































No. of companiesMean S. D. Median Min. Max.
Bargaining variables
Dummy for newly appointed top manager ( NEWCEO) 0.39 0.49001 0.216
***
Large managerial shareholder dummy ( MANSHA) 0.48 0.50001 -0.521
***
Ownership share of top manager (OWNCEO) (％) 6.41 13.41 0.04 0.00 97.12 -0.296
***
Ownership share of management group (OWNMAN) (％) 15.93 21.94 4.22 0.00 100.00 -0.338
***
Ownership share of corporate ownership and foreign investor ( OWNOUT) 1.87 2.14005 0.412
***
Business group member dummy (GROFIR) 0.39 0.49001 0.344
***
Core business group member dummy (GROCOR) 0.05 0.23001 0.013
Business group affiliation dummy (GROAFF) 0.34 0.47001 0.354
***
Other governance variables
Dummy for firms with a top manager of retirement age ( CEOAGE) 0.10 0.30001 0.016
Open joint-stock company dummy ( OPECOM) 0.68 0.47101 0.021
Dummy for firms with upper limits on ownership shares ( LIMOWN) 0.14 0.35001 -0.126
***
Dummy for firms with a collective executive organ ( COLEXE) 0.34 0.47001 0.079
**
Dummy for former state-owned or ex-municipal privatized companies ( PRICOM) 0.69 0.46101 -0.045
Dummy for firms separated from state-owned or privatized enterprises ( SPIOFF) 0.10 0.29001 -0.001
Total number of employees ( COMSIZ) 1884.44 5570.00 465 106 74000 0.207
***
(continued)










Number of business lines (BUSLIN) 2.15 2.05 1 1 12 0.165
***
Dummy for the development of new products or services in 2001-04 ( NEWPRO) 0.62 0.48101 -0.038
Annual average gross profit rate on sales in 2001-04 (PROAVE) 4.86 19.43 0.00 -25.28 197.91 0.135
***
Firms which used bank credits and their average lending period ( BANCRE) 2.53 1.45305 0.093
**
Share of exports in total sales (EXPSHA) 0.88 1.20005 0.072
*
[Other governance variables]  CEOAGE: "Top manager of retirement age" denotes a top manager aged 61 or older as of the survey date.   OPECOM: A dichotomous variable that equals 1 if the
company was established as an open joint-stock company.  LIMOWN: A dichotomous variable that assigns a value of 1 to firms that have an upper limit on ownership per shareholder in its articles of
incorporation. COLEXE: A collective executive organ headed by a company president that functions as an internal executive organization to supervise daily management matters. The Law on JSCs
prohibits 25% or more board membership from being represented by collective executive organ member
[Business-activity variables]  BUSLIN: A proxy for the level of business diversification measured by the OKONKh two-digit classification.  PROAVE: Industry-adjusted using a method proposed by
Eisenberg et al. (1998). BANCRE: "Firms which used bank credits and their average lending period" fall under one of the following 6 categories: 0: Did not use any bank credits during the period
from 2001 to 2004; 1: Used bank credits, and their average lending period was less than 3 months; 2:  Used bank credits, and their average lending period ranged from 3 months to less than 6 months;
3: Used bank credits, and their average lending period ranged from 6 months to less than one year; 4: Used bank credits, and their average lending period ranged from one year to less than 3 years; 5:
Used bank credits, and their average lending period was more than 3 years.  EXPSHA: "Share of exports in total sales" falls under one of the following 6 categories:  0: 0%; 1: 10% or less;  2: 10.1 to
25.0%; 3: 25.1 to 50.0%; 4: 50.1 to 75.0%; 5: More than 75%.
This table presents the definition, descriptive statistics, and data source of variables used in the empirical analyses and the correlation coefficients with the proportion of outsider directors measured by
dividing the number of outsider directors by the total number of board members ( OUTDIR). The samples are the same as those in Table 1. The SKRIN database was used for the ownership shares
held by company managers ( OWNCEO, and OWNMAN) and the numbers of business lines ( BUSLIN). The SPARK database was used for the annual average gross profit rate on sales ( PROAVE).
All other variables were created on the basis of the results of the 2005 joint enterprise survey. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. The following
are the supplementary variable definitions
[Bargaining variables]  OWNOUT: Excluding domestic individual shareholders. "Ownership share" means an ownership share rated on the following 6-point scale: 0: 0%; 1: 10.0% or less;  2: 10.1 to
25.0%; 3: 25.1 to 50.0%; 4: 50.1 to 75.0%; 5: 75.1 to100.0%. MANSHA: A dichotomous variable with a value of 1 if the company has a specific manager or a specific managerial group as its major
shareholder.  GROFIR: A dichotomous variable that assigns a value of 1 to member firms of a business group.  GROCOR: A dichotomous variable that assigns a value of 1 to core business group
firms. GROAFF: A dichotomous variable that assigns a value of 1 to business group affiliations.  NEWCEO: "New top manager" denotes a top manager (CEO, company president, or general director)
appointed during the period from 2001 to 2004 0-10％(G1) 0.77 0.55 13.40 27.47
10-20％(G2) 0.83 1.10 9.82 22.47
20-30％(G3) 0.79 1.55 6.49 21.19
30-40％(G4) 0.57 2.32 15.97 28.25
40-50％(G5) 0.61 1.73 10.54 22.04
50-60％(G6) 0.54 2.09 7.81 19.23
60-70％(G7) 0.41 2.33 5.03 12.12
70-80％(G8) 0.35 2.51 3.32 13.71
80-90％(G9) 0.19 3.01 2.63 7.11


























G1/G5 4.247 11.072 0.386 1.392
G6/G10 30.737







G5/G6 0.568 0.629 0.073 1.592
G4/G7 1.766 0.066 3.101 4.665
G3/G8 20.133






Number of observations 705 612 457 458
Value of ownership variable
This table presents results from the comparative analysis of ownership shares in Russian joint-stock
companies divided into 10 groups in terms of the proportion of outsider directors. The samples are the
same as those in Table 1. MANSHA is the large managerial shareholder dummy with a value of 1 if the
company has a specific manager or a specific managerial group as its large shareholder.  OWNOUT is
the 6-point-scale ownership share of outsider shareholders.  OWNCEO and OWNMAN are the percent
of shares held by a top manager and management group, respectively. Table 5 provides more detailed
variable definitions. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels,
ti l
Table 6.  Correlations of the proportion of outsider directors with ownership share by
company managers and outsider investors
OWNCEO OWNMAN
Proportion of outsider directors (group
no.)
OWNOUT MANSHAIndustrial sector 0.47
Fuel and energy 0.70
Metallurgy 0.53
Machine-building and metal working  0.49
Chemical and petrochemical 0.58





Comparison between the industrial and communications sectors
t test on the equality of means -4.125
***
Wilcoxon rank sum test  -4.372
***














This table presents results from an industry-to-industry comparative analysis of the
proportion of outsider directors on a corporate board of 730 Russian joint-stock companies.
The samples are the same as those in Table 1. The proportion of outsider directors is
measured by dividing the number of outsider directors by the total number of board
members for each sample firm. *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level.Models
Intercept -0.1824 -0.1540 -0.1310 0.1359 0.1886
(0.173) (0.174) (0.174) (0.201) (0.202)
Bargaining variables
NEWCEO (+) 0.0597 0.0605 0.0552 0.0318 0.0553













































(0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.056)
COLEXE (+) -0.0143 -0.0126 -0.0113 -0.0228 -0.0200
(0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.043) (0.043)
PRICOM (+) -0.0538 -0.0597 -0.0629 -0.0809 -0.0993
(0.053) (0.054) (0.053) (0.063) (0.063)
SPIOFF (+) -0.1001 -0.1050 -0.1130 -0.1849
** -0.1881
**





(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022)
Business-activity variables
BUSLIN (+) 0.0114 0.0115 0.0130 0.0097 0.0087



















(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.015) (0.015)
EXPSHA (-) -0.0606 -0.0612 -0.0608 -0.0542 -0.0629
(0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.044) (0.043)
EXPSHA
2 (+) 0.0150 0.0150 0.0154 0.0158 0.0187
*
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
(continued)
Table 8. Multivariate regression analysis of the impacts of governance and business-activity variables on board composition
[2] [1] [4] [3] [5](Table 8 continued)
Board size and leadership structure
BOASIZ (+) 0.1061 0.1031 0.1082 0.0429 0.0572







(0.039) (0.047) (0.047) (0.048) (0.048)
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 406 406 406 320 320







This table reports results from the regressions of board composition on the variables reflecting the bargaining power of company managers and their
countervailing parties (bargaining variables), the variables capturing the other elements of firm organization (other governance variables), and the
variables relating to business type, R&D/innovation activities, corporate financing, and financial performance (business-activity variables).  The
samples are the same as those in Table 1. We estimate models that take the proportion of outsider directors ( OUTDIR ) as the dependent variable by
NEWCEO is a dummy variable, which takes 1 for the firms with a top manager appointed in or after 2001.  MANSHA  is the large managerial
shareholder dummy with a value of 1 if the company has a specific manager or a specific managerial group as its major shareholder.   OWNCEO and
OWNMAN are the percent of shares held by a top manager and management group, respectively.  OWNOUT is the 6-point-scale ownership share of
outsider shareholders. GROFIR is a dummy variable of business group participation, and  GROCOR  and GROAFF are dummy variables which
assign a value of 1 to core group firms and group affiliations, respectively.  CEOAGE  assigns a value of 1 to firms with a top manager of retirement
age (61 or older). OPECOM is the open joint-stock company dummy. LIMOWN captures firms with upper limits on ownership shares
BUSLIN is the number of business lines as a proxy for business diversification.  NEWPRO is the dummy variable for firms that developed new
products or services in the period of 2001-04 as a proxy for the intensity of R&D/innovation activities.  PROAVE denotes the average rate of gross
profit on sales in 2001-04. BANCRE  captures firms which used bank credits and expresses their average lending period by a 6-point scale.  EXPSHA
is the share of exports in total sales measured by a 6-point scale
BOASIZ is the board size measured by the total number of board members.   OUTCHA  is the outsider chairman appointment dummy that equals 1 if
a firm has an outsider board chairman.  Table 5 provides more detailed variable definitions.  We estimate Models 2-5, which endogenize the
dependent variable and OUTCHA,  using the Murphy-Topel variance-covariance estimator for the two-step model.   OUTCHA  is instrumented by all
exogenous variables in the right-hand side and the 6-point-scale age level of board chairman as an additional instrument ( CHAAGE ).  Predicted signs
are indicated in parentheses following the abbreviation of the independent variables. Standard errors are given in parentheses beneath the regression
coefficients.  ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
COLEXE  takes 1 if a firm has a collective executive organ. PRICOM and SPIOFF are the dummy variables for former state-owned or ex-
municipal privatized companies and firms separated from state-owned or privatized enterprises, respectively.  COMSIZ is a proxy for company size
measured by the total number of employees. The log of COMSIZ is used in regressions.Appendix.  Competence of board of directors stipulated by the Law on Joint-stock Companies
Major field of competence Item of competence (applicable article)
Overseeing acquisitions, divestitures,
establishment, reorganization and
liquidation of company, branches and
affiliates
Approval of report on acquisition of shares for capital decrease (Art. 12(3)), Amendment of articles after opening/closing
branches and affiliates (Art. 12(5)), Proposal on merger-related matters to the general shareholders' meeting (Art. 16(2)),
Proposal on relevant matters to the general shareholders' meeting when absorbing any other companies (Art. 17(2)), Proposal
on new-division-related matters to the general shareholders' meeting (Art. 18(2)), Proposal on branch-related matters to the
general shareholders' meeting (Art. 19(2)), Proposal to the general shareholders' meeting on matters related to reorganization
into limited liability company or production cooperative (Art. 20(2)), Proposal to the  general shareholders' meeting on matters
related to liquidation and appointment of the liquidation committee (Art. 21(2)), Establishment of branches and affiliates (Art.
45 (1) Para. 14)
Overseeing major capital financing,
expenditures and transactions
Amendment of articles following capital increase (Art. 12(2))*, Issue of convertible bonds (Art. 33(2))*, Determination of
value of assets involved in investment in kind at new issue of shares (Art. 34(3)), Determination of public subscription price
for shares (Art. 36(1)), Determination of public subscription price for securities (Art. 38(1)), Capital increase by issuing new
shares (Art. 65 (1) Para. 5)*, Issue of bonds and other securities (Art. 65 (1) Para. 6)*, Determination of price for assets and
purchase price for issued securities (Art. 65 (1) Para. 7), Acquisition of own shares, bonds and other securities by the company
(Art. 65 (1) Para. 8)*, Recommendation to the general shareholders' meeting on dividend and way of allocation (Art. 65 (1)
Para. 11), Utilization of reserve funds and other funds (Art. 65 (1) Para. 12), Approval of major transactions (Art. 65 (1) Para.
15)*, Approval of transactions with interested parties (Art. 65 (1) Para. 16)*, Approval of the roster administrator and
conclusion/cancellation of contract with them (Art. 65 (1) Para. 17)
Preparing and organizing the general
shareholders' meeting
Selection of items on the agenda of the general shareholders' meeting (Art. 53(5)), Convocation of the general shareholders'
meeting (Art. 65(1) Para. 2), Approval of the agenda of the general shareholders' meeting (Art 65(1) Para. 3), Preparation for
the general shareholders' meeting (Art. 65(1) Para. 4)
Nominating, compensating, monitoring
and replacing corporate executives
Nomination of candidates for corporate organs (Art. 53(7)), Election of the executive organs and the early termination of their
power (Art. 45 (1) Para. 9)*, Recommendation to the general shareholders' meeting on remuneration of the audit committee
(auditors) members and the external auditor (Art. 45 (1) Para. 10), Election of the chairman of the board of directors (Art.
67(1)), Proposal to the general shareholders' meeting on external entrustment of authority of the single executive organ (Art.
69(1)), Signature of contract with executive officers (Art. 69(3)), Permission for executive officers to work for other companies
concurrently (Art. 69(3)), Election of the extraordinary single executive organ and convocation of the extraordinary
shareholders' meeting for election of the single executive organ (Art. 69(4)), Election of the extraordinary collective executive
organ and convocation of the extraordinary shareholders' meeting for election of the collective executive organ (Art. 70(2))
Reviewing and guiding corporate strategy,
major plans of action, business plans,
annual reports, and other financial and
internal documents
General leadership in corporate management except for exclusive competence of the general shareholders' meeting (Art. 64(1)),
Determination of priority direction for corporate management (Art. 65 (1), Para. 1), Approval of internal documents (Art. 65
(1) Para. 13), Request for audit of financial and managerial activities (Art. 85(3))**, Prior approval of annual report (Art.
88(4))
This table lists and classifies the competences of the board of directors of a joint-stock company stipulated by the Law on Joint-stock Companies of the Russian Federation (Law on JSCs)
effective during the period of the 2005 enterprise survey. The items of competence are not strictly and completely translated from the Law on JSCs. The symbols denote as follows: * -
competence which may be delegated to the board of directors if the general shareholders’ meeting resolves so, or the articles of incorporation specify so; and ** - matters under the competence
of the general shareholders’ meeting shared with the board of directors.